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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * ~ * * * * * * 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
-vs-
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
UTAH TURKEY GROWERS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Civil No. 16354 
* * * * * * * ~ ~ * * ~ * ~ * ~ * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant's Statement of the Nature of the 
Case is argumentative. While Plaintiff-Appellant does seek a 
money judgment against the Defendant-Respondent and Respondent 
did sell turkeys in which Appellant claimed a security interest, 
Respondent nevertheless paid to Appellant all sums Appellant's 
debtor could have demanded, and retained only those sums necess-
arily expended for processing and sale. While Appellant claims 
it had a security interest in the turkeys and their proceeds, the 
Respondent claims that by waiver, acquiescence and express 
consent all curtailments by Respondent were ratified and approved 
by Appellant. Appellant not only asks that Respondent pay twice 
but also asks that Respondent pay Appellant twice. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth 
Judicial District Judge presiding without a jury, granted judgment 
for the Defendant-Respondent on the Complaint and dismissed the 
counterclaim against the Plaintiff-Appellant for over-payments to 
it. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent asks this Court to affirm that 
portion of the lower court judgment which dismissed Plaintiff-
Appellant's complaint. Respondent has not appealed from that 
portion of the trial court's judgment which dismissed its coun-
terclaim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Record on Appeal is divided into two parts. The 
pleadings, other filings, discovery proceedings, and the Findings 
and Judgment will be referred to as the Record ("R. ") the testimony 
as the Transcript ("Tr.") and the Exhibits as "Exh.". 
Respondent will use the same designations Appellant has 
assigned to identify the parties. 
The Defendant-Respondent, Utah Turkey Growers, Inc. 
(hereafter UTG) is, and since 1973 has been, an agricultural 
marketing cooperative which processes and sells turkeys raised by 
its member growers. During the period 1973 through 1976 one of 
its member growers was a partnership comprised of Ivan E. Carlson. 
- 2 -
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Clair R. Carlson and Vernon J. Carlson, (hereinafter known as 
Carlson Brothers). 
Plaintiff-Appellant (hereafter Bank) had financed the 
turkey-growing operations of Carlson Brothers for some time both 
prior to and including the years 1973 through 1976 (Tr. 32-33, 
257). Carlson Brothers executed security agreements and finan-
cing statements in favor of the Bank for the years 1973 through 
1976 (Exhibit P-4, Tr. 32, 257-259) creating a security interest 
in Carlson Brothers' turkeys. (Exhibit, P-4) 
UTG honored this security interest and at no time 
material to these proceedings, nor at any time since Bank 
commenced its code filings, did UTG disburse any funds otherwise 
due Carlson Brothers other than directly to Bank with one Bank-
approved exception (See Finding #8, R.263). 
Bank had the burden of proving any payments made out of 
the trust created by its code filings but upon an abundance of 
uncontradicted evidence the Trial Court found: 
[Finding #8; R. 263,264] 
* * *at all times material to these 
proceedings the Defendant [UTG] paid to the 
Plaintiff [Bank] all of the proceeds which 
the Defendant received from the sale of 
turkeys delivered to the Defendant by 
Carlson Brothers and that checks or other documents 
were admitted into evidence which established that no 
payments were made by the Defendant out of the trust 
imposed by the Uniform Commercial Code filings. 
(See also Tr. p. 334) 
- 3 -
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NARRATIVE HISTORY OF THE THREE-PARTY RELATIONSHIP 
A condensed history of the association between Debtor 
(Carlson Brothers), Creditor (Bank), and the Defendant (UTG) may 
present a better organization of the operative facts. 
Carlson Brothers had been financed by Bank for many 
years (Tr. 32, 33, 257). Bank, pursuing its own interests, gave 
the incorporators of UTG some advice influencing UTG's structure 
suggesting, among other things, that Carlson Brothers should 
take a majority of the contemplated stock in the first (Sub-
Chapter "S") corporation (Tr. 364-367). That advice was accepted. 
1 
(Tr. 365) When UTG converted its corporate anatomy to become a 
cooperative Ivan Carlson became the President (Tr. 212, 268). 
In 1971 UTG became a turkey processing and marketing 
non-profit cooperative (Ex. D-23, 24) which received live birds 
from its constituents, slaughtered, dressed, froze, stored and 
then sold them, and thereafter settled from time to time with 
its members (Tr. p. 367) or their creditors, where appropriate 
(Tr. 334). 
The Bank wanted - had to have - Carlson Brothers' 
turkeys processed and sold to yield debt service funds (Tr. 
98). Live birds could not be sold in Utah (Tr. 367, 368). 
UTG engaged "master" sales services for the bulk of 
its growers' turkeys through membership in a national marketing 
co-operative, Norbest Turkeys, (Tr. 331, 332) \vhich made cash 
- 4 -
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payments and struck provisional settlements with UTG for birds 
oftentimes still in Norbest's freezers, having not yet been 
sold (Tr. 333). Such cash payments were made for unsold 1974 
turkeys relying on remarkably high 1973 prices (Tr. 373). 
Because the growers needed funds (Tr. 372) this cash was, in 
accordance with UTG's long-accepted practices and course of 
dealing compelled by the economic requirements of its grower-
constituents, distributed by UTG to members; except that Carlson 
Brothers' entitlement went to Bank (Tr. 334, 373; R. 263). 
While UTG had been paid by ~orbest for thuse stored 
birds at 1973 prices, the turkey market plunged in 1974 by 20 
cents per pound (Tr. 375). Projecting Carlson Brothers' six 
million pounds of production (Tr. 384) through this market 
decline will yield a justifiable and could have prompted a 
highly probable overpayment to them of $1.2 million dollars; 
however, the overpayment was not that high. A director of 
Norbest (Tr. 237) testified that it was necessary for Norbest 
to make "reverse settlements" (charge-backs) with its member 
co-ops, one of whom was UTG, to adjust for this steep decline 
(Tr. 239, 240). A Norbest computer did not detail this over-
payment (Tr. 360) and a qualified auditor was consulted, in 
general terms, about possible risks in advances who said "It 
looks all right to me." (Tr. 380) So the overpayment continued 
to be carried forward in UTG' s belief that proper "adjustments 
\·!ere being made" either through the computer or by Norbest (Tr. 
3 7 9) . 
- 5 -
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The trial court found no negligence or basis upon which 
to claim estoppel from these events (Tr. 393 - From the Judge's 
bench ruling). 
Bank's claim, although rejected by the trial court for 
many other reasons, that each year comprised a segmented, inde-
pendent episode whose settlement is definitive and not influent~l 
to, or influenced by, that of any other year or years, is 
likewise discredited by other factors which contributed to over-
payments to Bank for credit to the loan of Carlson Brothers: 
(l) enormous carry-overs for two years and longer of frozen 
turkey inventories (Tr. 48, 114, 220, 335; Exh. P-35) were 
allocated to the members' accounts; and (2) Federal regulatory 
agencies required $650,000.00 of improvements to UTG's plant 
(Tr. 381, 382). Financing through the Sacramento Bank for Coops 
and operating on a cost-plus, progress payment basis, UTG was 
experiencing cash flow not from earned income from 1972 through 
1974 but from debt it was creating and still owes (Tr. 382). 
The impact of this would not have been realized until 1975 
settlement time arrived (Tr. 383). Hhen that impact did emerge the I 
same CPA firm was asked to investigate which did not report 
until 1976 (Tr. 383). 
For these, as for many other reasons shown hereafter, 
each year's activity is inextricably bound up with each other 
year's economics and all are tied together. 
In December, 1974 a check was issued to Bank for 
$262,362.47 (Ex. P-18) as an advance against Carlson Brothers' 
- 6 -
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production which Carlson Brothers obviously had earned (Tr. 288, 
385); then in August, 1975 a check was made to Bank for $759,337.97 
(Exh. P-19) which was an estimate of total earnings to Carlson 
Brothers for 1974 birds but which did not take into account the 
prior July's check. It was overlooked by a Mrs. Mickelsen, the 
bookkeeper, who testified that it was "just an oversight" (Tr. 
288). But Ivan Carlson was President of Utah Turkey Growers at 
the time of the check (Tr. 212) and according to the only testimony 
on it, given Carlsons' large annual production of $3,000,000.00, 
the August 1975 check was not perceptibly large (Tr. 385). 
The following is a chronology and summary of excess pay-
ments to Bank on behalf of Carlson Brothers (From Exh. P-16): 
DETAIL 
hoportionate share 
(49/'o) of excess 
payments to members 
1973 
~ 1973 $64,254 
hoportionate share 
(36/'o) of excess 
payment to members 
1974 
~ 1974 $120,627 
i Excess cash 
1975 
payment $272,725 
CUMULATIVE 
DEFICIT 
$ 64,254 
$184,881 
$457,606 
After UTG set off the over-payments to Carlson Brothers 
against later years' production, Carlsons still owed (and yet 
o1,e) UTG $31,213.00 (Exh. P-35). 
- 7 - J 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
WAIVER OF SECURITY INTEREST GENERALLY 
Throughout this time the Bank certainly did not become 
alarmed and although they could and should have identified the 
over-payment if UTG was expected to, did not show any concern 
for the account (Tr. 370). 
Indicative of either the Bank's inattentiveness or 
indifference to the Carlson Brothers' account at UTG or its 
approval of disbursements by UTG for Carlson Brothers' account, 
is a matter pursued at the trial, rejected by the trial court, 
and abandoned by Bank on appeal: 
Bank demanded that they be reimbursed, as a consequence 
of conversion, for $183,713.22 which UTG paid, to a hatchery 
firm for Carlson Brothers' turkey poults in the year 1974, 
out of Carlson Brothers' entitlement to distribution of the 
cooperative sales (R. 172, 196). 
The uncontradicted testimony at the trial was that the 
Bank "would have approved" purchase and payment by UTG of 
Carlson Brothers' poults out of the latter's production and 
while denying that they had expressly authorized it unequivocally! 
declared that they countenanced "the procedure" (Tr. 118). I I 
Ivan Carlson testified that UTG and Carlson Brothers hac [ 
been expressly authorized by Bank to make such payment (Tr. 272) 
and the Court so found (Finding jf9; R. 264). 
- 8 -
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Bank knew that Carlson Brothers' turkeys were being 
processed and sold and the proceeds from the sales received and 
administered and disbursed totally by UTG (Tr. 89). One witness 
for Bank acknowledged (Tr. 98) and the Norbest director (Tr. 243) 
and other uncontradicted testimony (Tr. 368) established that there 
was no other way Carlson Brothers' turkeys - or anyone else's -
could be converted to cash. 
Bank did not want a security interest in the birds live, 
processed or frozen. They wanted UTG to conduct their affairs just 
as they did. The Bank officers visited the plant, asked general 
questions about handling turkeys, identifying the pool and inquired 
about settlements but never advised UTG of the amount of their 
loans or of Bank's opinion of the financial condition of Carlson 
Brothers or any apprehensiveness concerning it. (Tr. 370, 371; See 
also Tr. 224, lines 10-12 where Mr. Harward testified that the Bank 
"never asked about the condition of Carlson Brothers' account") 
HAIVER OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PROCEEDS 
There were many "carry-back" and "carry-forward" adjust-
ments during all of this period (Tr. 220, 254, 324). Bank's loan 
officer who was pre-eminent in this transaction acknowledged he 
knew that there was carry-over storage (Tr. 48, Lines 8 & 9) · 
Being aware of carry-forward inventories he nevertheless did not 
inquire to determine that inventories would be carried into years 
exceeding two (lines ll-15) although he did indicate he was aware 
of the inventory "pool" (Lines 21, 22). (See also Lines 1-5, Tr. 
i,g) 
- 9 -
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Respecting the $183,000.00 poult check of October, 1974, 
the Bank was approached about a direct payment from Carlson Bro-
thers' account to S & R Hatchery to provide Carlson Brothers with 
1974 poults. Bank's loan officer testified, "I think the procedur;! 
in the past was to see that the poults got paid for" (Tr. 118). 
Bank's officer Marlo Cloward when approached about the 
matter by Ivan Carlson, said that he "didn't have any objection to 
it" (Tr. 272). Bank had a listing of poults as they were received 
by Carlson Brothers (Tr. 270). Bank was cautious to list them~ 
number and age (brood) on their security agreements (Exh. P-4). 
If Bank had insisted upon a year-by-year accounting and settlement I 
they could have easily projected poult numbers into grown birds, 
grown birds into poundage, multiplied that figure by market prices 
and determined the aDount of check they should have received from 
Carlsons' production. There is no evidence that they did so at 
anytime. Nor is there any evidence that Bank, by the same com-
putations either for their own purposes in determining whether or 
not to make future advances to Carlsons or to ascertain that Bank 
had been overpaid - as they had - observed the $262,000.00 excess 
payment in the August, 1975 check (Tr. 293) which they then might 
have called to the attention of UTG. 
BANK'S CLAIM OF NEGLIGENCE 
The trial court ruled that there was no negligence to 
be found in any conduct of UTG. In Finding #10 (R.265) the 
- 10 -
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Court found that ''the failure to detect issuance of the earlier 
check in making the payment of August 15, 1975 was neither 
ordinary or gross negligence* * *nor did it constitute failure 
to exercise due care but was an inadvertent mistake". This was 
based on evidence that, given Carlsons' consequential annual 
production, the check of 1975 did not appear to be large (Tr. 
385). It was also based on high magnitude carry-over from year 
to year of frozen inventories (Tr. 220). The Court also found 
(Finding #12; R.266) that it was of no pecuniary advantage to 
' UTG that its officers misrepresent or make any representation in 
negligent disregard of any duty it might have to First Security 
to make statements concerning poundage standing to Carlson 
&others' credit (R.266, 267). The Court found (Finding #15) 
that the letter of January 7, 1976 concerning poundage was made 
~ good faith and was the product ,of the exercise of ordinary 
prudence and due care, was made gratuitously and without the 
intention of gaining an advantage to itself (R.268). 
This finding is likewise based upon uncontradicted 
evidence. At the time of this letter UTG did not know it would 
have to impose upon Carlson Brothers any charge-backs (Tr. 222, 
223) . 
When Bank solicited the letter of January, 1976, they 
did not ask about any monies Carlsons may owe the cooperative 
(UTG) but only asked about the inventories (Tr. 224). 
- 11 -
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Intervention by Federal inspectors required UTG to 
borrow funds and disburse them at different intervals (Tr. 381, 
382). The "buriecl" deficit was not unusual in the industry (Tr. 
239) and in particular in the case of Carlson Brothers (Tr. 
385). 
The precipitous drop in turkey prices (Tr. 375) could 
not but have thrown accounts, in which inventories were a 
dominant factor, out of smooth-flowing administration. Other 
turkey cooperatives became unbalanced by the same price perfidies 
(Tr. 239,240) and an auditor indicated there was no risk in 
making the advancements which later resulted in reverse settle-
ments or set-offs (Tr. 380). UTG having "cashed out" a six 
million pound prod'Kcion of Carlson Brothers with a proportion-
ately like amount to its other producers could not have prudently 
kept the cash in reserve when its farmers needed the money (Tr. 
373). UTG had no control over the 1974 year in which poult 
market conditions and prices reached "disastrous" proportions 
(Tr. 382). This "disastrous year" could not have been reflected 
until the 1975 settlement (Tr.383) and at that time Carlsons had 
become indebted to UTG by over $450,000.00 (Tr. 127,128). 
More pervasively, the Court found that the Bank did 
not at any time change its position based upon failure to 
know of any of the facts disclosed by audit and that there 
was no actionable neglect or negligence or any failure to 
exercise due care attributable to the Defendant or any of its 
agents or officers (R.271). The Court expressed this in his 
- 12 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
bench ruling (Tr. 393) stating that there was no actionable 
negligence and no conduct upon which the Bank could predicate 
an estoppel. These findings were based upon the substantial 
evidence catalogued above. 
"LIVE FLOCK" CONTRACT 
In its brief (pp. 5-7, 13, 14) Bank emphasizes a 
"live flock" contract which it says altered the marketing 
arrangement between Bank, UTG and Carlson Brothers. This 
agreement was not made known to UTG until June, 1976 prior to 
which time Bank was firmly entrenched in and financially 
committed to its 1976 loans to Carlson Brothers (Tr. 96). 
Consequently, there could have been no prejudice to them. 
Carlsons were already well into production (Tr. 225) and 
could not have gone any other place for processing birds (Tr. 
240, 321). The "live flock" agreement did not change the 
relationship between any of the parties but dealt with accounting 
for the purpose of sales only (Tr. 183). "~ile there was a 
separate accounting procedure it was only to the extent that 
Carlson Brothers' turkeys were not "pooled". In effect UTG 
bought the turkeys from Carlson Brothers (Tr. 183, Exh. P-
12). UTG did not become a debtor of Carlson Brothers because 
i·.·hen the "live flock" agreement was executed Carlson Brothers 
~ed UTG far in excess of Carlson Brothers' 1976 production. 
(Exhs. P-16, P-35). 
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CONTINUOUS NATURE OF UTG' S TRANSACT_IONS AND ACCOUNTS WITH MEMBEK' 
Long-term carry-over of substantial frozen turkey in-
ventories (Tr. 220, 114, 48, 335); continuing Norbest "reverse 
settlements'' (Tr. 25); plant renovations and debt retirement 
therefor (Tr. 382); growers' provisional settlements out of 
monies borrowed against stored inventories (Tr. 219) as well as 
the fluctuation of equity position of plant ownership by reason 
of its debt (Tr. 382) all illustrate a long course of dealing-
involving all grower members of UTG as well as Bank's entitlement 
to turkey proceeds - which galvanizes the testimony of witnesses 
that no production season was severable from the others (Tr. 
335) and there was never any "final" settlement (Tr. 387). 
The period 1973 - 1976 embraces all the credits, debits. 
and set-offs and it ~s :='ank' s evident purpose to segment each of 
the years within that period and endeavor to create a new 
relationship emerging at the conclusion of any growing period 
and the beginning of a new turkey pool. For the foregoing 
reasons this simply was not the case. 
The trial court found that: 
(Finding #6) 
~' * '~while there was an annual period to which 
production of different years could be assigned 
* * *there was no specific cut-off or ending period 
where settlements were final as to any production 
or marketing processes; but there was a continuous 
and uninterrupted series of transactions which 
extended through all of the years material to 
these proceedings* * *by a course of dealing 
- 14 -
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by the parties which required the making of 
credit as well as debit entries and the continuous 
carrying forward of an inventory of frozen turkeys 
* * *also in part the product of sharply fluctuating 
market prices*** (R.263). 
NO INTENT TO MISLEAD OR PURPOSE TO GAIN PECUNIARILY 
In the Brief of Appellant the Bank talks about "the 
impact" of UTG's negligence (Brief, p. 27) and UTG's "pecuniary 
interest" in Carlson Brothers' continued financing by Bank 
(Brief, p. 31). 
Reading those two statements together, as they are 
presented in the Brief, there may arise an implication that 
Carlson Brothers was such a valued constituent of UTG that it 
would be in the latter's interests to induce Bank to continue 
financing Carlson Brothers to sustain its turkey production. 
lfuile no direct claim of intentional deception follows those 
point headings they do require an answer. At Page 222 of the 
Transcript Gaylord Harward was asked if he had any intention of 
deceiving First Security Bank by the letter of January 7, 1976 
to which Bank's counsel objected. The objection was sustained 
after Bank's counsel stated: 
The contention of the Bank is that they 
were negligent and that they were not trying 
to be fraudulent. 
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There is, in fact, no evidence to support negligence 
and none was offered to show fraud or deception. 
More importantly there is nothing in the record whatso-
ever to show that UTG would gain a pecuniary advantage by 
Carlson Brothers'remaining in the cooperative or that financing 
was required to keep them in or that if financing was required 
it could not have been obtained elsewhere than from First 
Security Bank. 
RELIANCE BY BANK 
Bank's best testimony was that it relied in part on 
information from UTG in determining whether or not to finance 
Carlson Brothers in 1976 (Tr. 52). One witness said, "It was 
a very basic factor" in the decision to extend credit for the 
1976 operations (Tr. 101). 
The office manager of UTG did not ever intend that any 
information he gave Bank would be relied upon for new credit. 
As Bank's Brief (p.8) correctly analyzes the dialogue he [the 
office manager] assumed the Bank wanted the requested information 
because Carlson Brothers had outstanding obligations it owed to 
the Bank (Tr. 155). In other words, he anticipated no new con-
sideration premised upon the information he furnished Bank in 
good faith. 
We have researched the record sedulously and represent , 
to the Court there is no testimony that the Bank would not have 
made any loan to Carlson Brothers or declined any further advan· 
ces had they known the statistics, the economics, or any facts 
which they now know. 
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AGREEHENT BETHEEN CARLSON BROTHERS AND UTG FOR SET-OFF 
A meeting was held in mid-1976 of all the members of 
UTG at which the over-advance to growers, including Carlson 
Brothers, was discussed in view of the audit and audit reports. 
Although they did not specifically discuss an off-set in the 
meeting, Ivan Carlson stated that "it was just something that we 
had always taken care of. We just expected it to be done* * *" 
(Tr. 279, 280) . Indeed, Hr. Carlson testified that there had 
been set-off charges of a similar nature in every year but not 
of as major a nature as the one involved here (Tr. 262). 
However, in one instance Carlson Brothers had been under-advanced 
$10 to $12,000.00 which had been made up to them in later vears 
(Tr. 387). 
All members of the Carlson Brothers partnership agreed 
that the set-off had to be made (Tr. 264). 
ASSIGNMENT UNDER 70A-9-318 
In July, 1976, First Security Bank prepared for Carlson 
.r.
1 d G Brothers an assignment which "authorized and instructe UT to 
make all checks or amounts due us from the sale of stored 
turkeys or live turkeys, past, present and future to First 
Security Bank". The instructions were thereafter to leave the 
came of Carlson Brothers off checks for their production. (Exh. 
P-ll) . 
- 17 -
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STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS UPON \.JHICH THE APPEAL TURNS 
I 
1] WHETHER OR NOT A COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION 1 
IS COMPELLED TO PAY A MEMBER'S CREDITOR TWICE, DUE TO PRIOR 
UNINTENTIONAL OVERPAYMENTS TO THE SAME CREDITOR. 
2] WHETHER OR NOT A COOPERATIVE M~Y BE REQUIRED TO 
PAY A MEMBER'S CREDITOR MORE THAN IT OWES THE MEMBER. 
3] WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING T~T THE , 
CREDITOR ~D WAIVED ITS SECURITY INTEREST IS BASED ON SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
4] WHETHER OR NOT A COOPERATIVE ~S A HIGHER DUTY TO 
A MEMBER'S CREDITOR THAN IT OWES THE MEMBER TO AUDIT AND VERIFY 
THE MEMBER'S ACCOUNT. 
5] DOES A STRANGER TO A COOPERATIVE'S DEALINGS ~VE A 
RIGHT TO RECEIVE - AND DOES THE COOPERATIVE ~VE A CORRESPONDING 
DUTY TO GIVE T~T STRANGER - GRATUITOUS INFORMATION INNOCENTLY 
INCOMPLETE UPON WHICH THE STRANGER MAY RELY? 
6] DOES GIVING INNOCENTLY INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
CONSTITUTE ~EGLIGENCE \\THERE ALL INFORMATION ASKED FOR WAS 
SUPPLIED? 
ARGUMENT 
PREFACE 
It is better practice to confront an Appellant's 
Brief point against point, serially; however in this case one 
rule of law which Bank ignores overwhelms all the provisions, 
statutory and common law, advanced by its brief and one 
principle governing the scope of review so affects the entire 
appeal that we respectfully treat those consjderations first 
following which we will respond, in order, to Bank's several 
claims of error. 
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POINT I 
ANY CLAIM OF BANK CAN NEVER RISE TO A LEVEL HIGHER 
THAN RIGHTS WHICH CARLSON BROTHERS COULD ASSERT 
AGAINST UTG AND THOSE RIGHTS WERE EXTINGUISHED 
BY OVER-PAYMENT. 
A. APPLICATION OF THE RULE HAS BEEN EXPANDED 
BY THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (§70A-9-318) 
RESPECTING ASSIGNMENTS. 
B. BANK'S ONLY RIGHTS ARE IN THE NATURE OF AN ASSIGNMENT. 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There is a doctrine co-existent with the law of assign-
ments and chattel mortgages that the rights acquired by a 
claimant pursuant to assignment, subrogation, mortgage, pledge, 
or hypothecation can rise to no higher level in dignity, quality 
or amount than those of the assignor. Chemical Bank vs. State 
of New York, 27 Ad.2d 427, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 813. An assignee 
acquires no greater right than was possessed by his assignor and 
simply stands in the shoes of the latter. 6 AmJur 2d p.282, 
Assignments, §102. The assignee is subject to any setoff or 
counterclaim available to the obligor against the assignor. Id. 
at p. 283. Likewise, the rights to which a subrogee succeeds 
are subject to the limitations, burdens and disqualifications 
incident to them in the hands of the party to whom he is sub-
rogated. 73 AmJur 2d 666, Subrogation, §107. 
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A. THIS PRINCIPLE IS CODIFIED BY THE SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS CHAPTER OF THE UNIFORM COt:2•!ERCIAL 
CODE IN SECTION 70A-9-318, UCA, 1953. 
Section 70A-9-318 (l) and (2) lJCA, 1953 provide in 
substance that the rights of an assignee are subject to "all 
the terms of the contract bet\.Jeen the account debtor and 
assignor and any defense or claim arising ther£>from", or unre-
lated thereto. 
Under subsection (l) (a) it !'lakes no difference 
whether the breach giving rise to the defense occurs before or 
after the account debtor is notified and under (l)(b) the 
account debtor may maintain defenses and claims against the 
assignee c:c: .cin2 i;-;clcpendently of the contract. Under subsectio:l 
(2) if t~e _ -~~3ct is modified in good faith and in accord-
ance with reasonable commercial standards it is effective 
against an assignee regardless of notification to the account 
debtor. 
Here UTG is the "account debtor", Carlson Brothers is 
the "assignor" and Bank is the "assignee". The "contract 
right" is not the security agreement but is the entitlement of 
Carlson Brothers to obtain their proportionate share of the 
proceeds of the common pool during the period 1973 through 
1975 and the live flock of 1976. (S0e 70A-9-l06 and Offirial 
Comments of National Conference of Commissioners on ilniform 
State La\vS [hereafter "Code Comm~Cnts"]) 
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io:.l 
The "contract" between the account debtor (UTG) and 
the assignor (Carlson Brothers) is made up of the organic 
instruments of UTG which provide for processing and sale of and 
distribution of net proceeds to members by the cooperative from 
the turkeys handled (Exh. D-23 and 24) together with the course 
of dealing and usage of trade (70A-l-205) which have grown up 
through their 10 years of business dealings (Tr. 364). Among 
those business dealings is the revolving account of advances, 
settlements, reverse settlements, charge-backs and set-offs. 
The "contract right" of llTG to set-offs inherent in that 
arrangement is that to which Bank is expressly subject. 
"Notification" in this case might be the constructive 
notice achieved by filing the financing statement with the 
Secretary of State or by notice of the 1976 live flock agreement. 
However, notice is not required because the defenses, set-offs, 
and counterclaims UTG asserts all arise out of the contract. 
(70A-9-318(1) [a]). 
As Bank admits in its brief, and as the record 
establishes, all of UTG's set-offs against Carlson Brothers, 
and therefore against Bank's lawsuit, are as a result of 
indebtednesses from Carlson Brothers to UTG created before 
either the 1976 filing or the 1976 live flock agreement. (App~ 
ellant's brief, p. 10; Exh. P-16). 
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B. BANK'S RIGHTS ARE IN THE NATURE OF AN ASSIGNMENT. 
The security interests of the Bank have all the 
characteristics of an assignment and cannot be applied in the 
same way that a conventional security agreement - financing 
statement arrangement might otherwise be enforced (i.e. by 
taking possession of the collateral, by foreclosure, or public 
or private sale, ecc.). The Bank recognized that they had in 
practice and in fact created their security interest by assign-
ment rather than by the Code filing when First Security drafted 
and Carlson Brothers executed Exhibit P-12 which is an assignment 
of "all checks or amounts due us from the sale of stored turkeys 
or live turkeys, past, present and future." 
Bank's ~ndE~standing is further illustrated by the un-
contradicted evidence that Bank certainly did not want possession 
of the turkeys, either live, dressed, packaged or frozen (Tr. 
38). A literal enforcement of the security agreement upon 
default, i.e.: delivery to them of the turkeys, would be 
absurd. Bank's permission to UTG that it deduct processing, 
poult purchase, Norbest commission, storage and all other 
charges (Tr. 38; 114; 230; 262; 272; 280) and its acquiescence 
in carry-forward of large inventories and the use of them as 
collateral for loans from Norbest (Tr. 48) waived Bank's 
literal and strict rights to enforcement against "first generatic! 
proceeds. Clovis National Bank vs. Tho~as, 425 P2d 726 (N.M. 
1967); Hedrick Savings Bank vs. Myers, 229 NVI/d 252 (Iowa, 1975) 
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The practical construction of the parties placed on 
the instruments became in fact the same as an assignment. 
Assignments, under the Uniform Commercial Code, are 
security interests and have been placed by the Code Commissioners 
in the chapter on Secured Transactions (Section 9-318). The 
term "security interest" includes those in contract rights 
[Section 70A-l-201(37)]. 
Bank's collateral is the "contract rights" Carlson 
Brothers held against UTG. [70A-9-10S(c)] The contract rights 
include any right to payment under a contract not yet earned 
and not evidenced by an instrument (70A-9-106). 
Section 9-318 of the Commercial Code subjects assign-
ents of that type of contract rights to all defenses and all 
terms of the contract between the account debtor (UTG) and the 
assignor (Carlson Brothers) and any defense or claim arising 
from or under the contract. 
states: 
Respecting subsection (1) of 9-318, the Code Comment 
Subsection (1) makes no substantial change in 
prior law and assignee has traditionally been 
subject to defenses or set-offs existing before 
an account debtor is notified of the assignment. 
\ihen the account debtor's defenses on an assigned 
account* * *or a contract right arise from the 
contract between him and the assignor it makes 
no difference whether the breach giving rise to 
the defenses occurs before or after the account 
debtor is notified of the assignment. The account 
debtor may also have claims against the assignor 
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which arise independently of that contract. 
Uniform Commercial Code, American Law Institute 
National Conference of Uniform State Laws, Z962 
Official Text, with Comments, p. 693. (The Official 
Text 1972 adopted substantially by Utah in Laws, 1977 
Chapter 272 is not materially different) 
Subsection (2) of 70A-9-318 allows the original parties I 
to the assigned contract - in this case UTG and Carlson Brothers ·1 
to adopt modifications of the contract which are commercially 
reasonable even after notification of the assignment (See Code 
Cormnent #2). 
In the Oregon Supreme Court decision of Investment 
Services Company vs. North Pacific Lumber Company, 492 P2d 470 (0: 
1972) Section 9-318 of the Model Code was applied to sustain a 
defense against perfected code filings in a case weaker on its 
facts t~an [~G presents here. In that case a lumber manufacturer 
assigned a series of contracts to the Plaintiff Bank. The lumber 
purchaser (account debtor) observed defects in the first shipme~ 
and set-off its claim for defective lumber in payments made to 
the Bank. The rationale of the decision is that because of the 
over-payment to Bank by the account debtor respecting the first 
shipment made the legal consequences identical to a "loan" by th< 
account debtor to the Bank and whenever the Bank acquired a clai: 
against. the account debtor it was entitled to set-off that amour.: 
I just the same as it would have had against a loan which the Bank I 
had made to the Defendant. [492 F2d at 472] I 
- 24 -
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The rights of the assignee of an account receivable 
are subject to contract defenses or claims of the account debtor 
arising by virtue of the terms of the contract out of which the 
receivable was created. (See Gilmore, "The Assignee of Contract 
Rights and his Precarious Security", 74 Yale L .J. 217, 230 (1964)). 
James Talcott, Inc. vs. H. Corenzwit and Company, 387 A 2d 
350, 76N.J. 305 (1978). 
POINT II 
THE LAWSUIT BROUGHT BY THE BANK, CONTAINING 
ELEMENTS OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND CLAIMED 
NEGLIGENCE, IS STRICTLY AN ACTION AT LAW 
~~ THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE TO BE 
GIVEN CONTROLLING IF NOT DISPOSITIVE WEIGHT. 
A. SUITS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
ARE ACTIONS AT LAW. 
An extraordinarily important rule adopted in all 
these cases, both those cited for support of Bank's as well as 
UTG's position, is that they are actions at law and the trial 
court's findings, if supported by any credible evidence, are 
to be given controlling weight. Baker Production Credit Assn. 
vs. Long Creek Meat Company, 513 P2d 1129, the ruling on which 
Bank relies almost exclusively, was decided entirely on the 
conclusive effect accorded the findings of the trial court on 
review. Correspondingly, in Hedrick Savings Bank vs. Myers, 
229 NW2d 252 (1975) the Iowa Supreme Court states: 
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This is a law action tried without a jury. 
The trial court's findings are binding on 
us if supported by substantial evidence. 
Such findings have the effect of a jury 
verdict to be disturbed only if induced by 
an erroneous application of law. 
As to the method the Iowa Supreme Court utilized in 
applying this principle to a Uniform Commercial Code case, it 
proceeded: 
The question whether plaintiff's lien was 
waived by authorizing various sales to 
defendants raises controversial issues 
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code* * ~~we hold there is substantial 
evidence to support the trial court's finding 
that, from the very beginning of plaintiff's 
relationship with Eckley, sales of livestock 
pledged as collateral were made to various 
dealers. Plaintiff had knowledge of this, 
raised no objection, accepted checks from 
these sales for credit to Eckley's account, 
and clearly relied on Eckley's honesty to 
properly account for the proceeds. This 
established a course of dealing from which 
thetrial court could find, as it did, 
implied authority to sell to defendants in 
the challenged transactions~~ ,., 1<We find 
both the result and the rationale of Clovis 
and cases which follow it more persuasive 
and we now adopt it* * *We rely on* * *the 
principle that evidence of a course of 
dealing has relevance in interpreting agreements 
under the Uniform Commercial Code* * *We now 
hold a prior course of dealing may, upon 
proper proof, constitute authority to sell 
pledged collateral under [70A-9-306] 
As used in the statute, "otherwise" should be 
construed to include a prior course of 
dealing. (See Uniform Commercial Code (1972) 
J. White and R. Summer, pp. 84-86) 
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The trial court here made the following finding: 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff knew 
approved, ratified, desired and expected that 
the Defendant would and was organized to slaughter, 
dress, process, store in frozen condition, 
transport to destinations within and without 
the State of Utah, and ultimately sell the 
turkeys upon which Plaintiff had filed financing 
statements based upon security agreements from 
Carlson Brothers and that the Plaintiff by words, 
acts, conduct and instructions as well as by 
acquiescence and implied consent, waived its right 
to claim or assert any conversion or any right of 
action against Defendant for the tort of converting 
turkeys grown by Carlson Brothers and delivered to 
the Defendant for the services performed by the 
Defendant. The Court finds that the Defendant 
did not at any time interfere with the rights 
of the Plaintiff in or to the collateral covered 
by the Plaintiff's security agreements and financing 
statements but finds that every service performed 
by the Defendant for Carlson Brothers and respecting 
the turkeys grown by Carlson Brothers added value 
to the product and was done at the instance, request, 
consent. and acquiescence and affirmative approval 
of the Plaintiff. The Court finds that 
those services were not available elsewhere. 
[Finding No. 5, R. 262] 
B. SUITS BASED UPON NEGLIGENCE ARE ACTIONS AT 
LAW AND FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE NOT 
TO BE DISTURBED UNLESS CLEARLY AGAINST THE 
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. 
In CiuJ:rlton l'S. Hackett, 11 U2d 389, 360 P2d 
176 (1961) Justice Crockett wrote: 
In considering the attack on the findings 
and judb~ent of the trial court it is our duty 
to follow these cardinal rules of review: to 
indulge them a presumption of validity and 
correctness; to require the appellant to 
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sustain the burden of showing error; to review 
the record in the light most favorable to them; 
and not to disturb them if they find substantial 
support in the evidence. 
In Artgerman Company, Inc., vs. Edgemon, 76 U 394, 290 
169 (1930) this Court in a decision that has never been over-
ruled or modified held that findings respecting negligence by a 
court sitting without a jury if based upon substantial evidence 
will not be over-turned. The decision states, "This Court is 
powerless to interfere with it even if it was disposed to do so". 
(76 U at 400) See also olesperson vs. Deseret News Pub. Co., 225 
P2d 1050, 119 U 235 (1950); Santi vs. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 
L+42 P2d 921, 21 U2d 157 (1968); Leon Glazier & Sons, Inc., vs. 
Larson, 491 P2d 226, 26 U2d 429 (1971). 
The qe1estion of negligence is an issue of fact precluded 
from review (5 ArnJur 2d 271, Appeal and Error, 829), and even if 
there is a direct conflict in testimony upon a matter of fact the 
question of negligence* * *must be left to the jury [or trier of 
fact] to determine (57 ArnJur 2d 343, Negligence, §7). A finding 
by the trier of fact on the standard of care to be applied is a 
determination of fact, not one of law. See pp. 38, 39, infr·a. 
SUMMARY OF POINTS I AND II 
It is our respectful contention that the foregoing two 
axioms: (Point) I, it is impossible to heighten, by assignment, 
the dignity of a claim; and (Point) II the scope of review shouL 
be limited by those rules applicable to actions purely at law, 
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2 I 
I 
galvanize all of UTG's arguments hereinafter which address the 
several points of Appellant's brief. 
POINT III 
THE BANK \<JAIVED ITS SECURITY INTEREST IN 
THE 1973 THROUGH 1976 CARLSON BROTHERS' 
TURKEYS AND IN THE PROCEEDS THEREOF AND 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SO HELD. 
It is well settled that a private statutory right can be 
28 AmJur 2d 850, E:;toppel and f·.aiver, §164. Rights in 
a perfected security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code 
have been judicially determined waived by the secured party. 
Clovi.s -''.1 ::.t;~onaZ E',1nk vs. Thomas~ 425 P2d 726 (N.M. 1967); 
cases cited therein. 
The definition of waiver is an intentional choice to 
forego some right or advantage which one might have demanded or 
insisted upon. 28 AmJur 2d, p.837, Estoppel and Waiver, §154. 
In the r:ov~P case, supra, the secured party held an agreement 
prohibiting sale of the collateral ,,-,ithout prior written consent. 
U~on a finding that the secured party had permitted the debtor to 
sell the collateral, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the 
security interest was terminated and no conversion resulted either 
in the collateral or its proceeds. 
In the C!cl'ic case the Bank even told the Defendant that 
it had some interest in the cattle and asked that the Bank be 
n~med as a party on the check. The Court concluded that the Bank 
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intentionally abandoned a known right by not exercising its 
clearly understood, unqualified privilege to require author-
ization to a sale. 
The Bank cites Baker Production Credit Association vs. 
Lon,; Creek Meat Company, 513 P2d 1129 (Ore. 1973). The issue in 
that case, however, was not whether the secured party had con-
sen ted to the sale thereby waiving the security interest; it was, 
rather, the conditional character of the consent. The Oregon 
Supreme Court held that the consent was expressly conditioned on ! 
the secured party's requirement that it be paid out of the 
proceeds. The proceeds were not paid to the secured party, the 
condition of the waiver was therefore not met and a conversion 
occurred. In Baker the Oregon Supreme Court recognizes the 
Clovis principle of waiver by stating that a secured party is 
preferred except ~he~e he waives his interests by authorizing 
actions* * 1•which are inconsistent with that interest. 
The Baker case is clearly no precedent for the prop-
osition Bank urges upon this Court. 
Clovis, on the other hand, is accepted as law by every 
Court commenting upon its result and was paid the ultimate 
respect by the legislature of New Mexico which expressly legis-
1 
lated the holding pertinent to this issue out of existence. (See I 
Vermi ZZion PCA vs. Izzard, 249 NE2d 352 [Ill. 1969]) (N.M. Stat. 
Ann. '53, SOA-9-1-205(4)). Utah's legislature has taken no such 
action. 
In Clovis, New Mexico holds that there was then no 
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provision of the Uniform Commercial Code displacing the law of 
waiver and particularly law of waiver by implied acquiescence or 
consent. 
~lithin tl-te case of Vermillion County Production Credit 
lissociation vs. Iz::.ard> 249 NE2d 352 (Ill. 1969) Clovis is still 
accepted as law unless there is legislation auxiliary or supp-
lemental to it. To avoid the consequence of Clovis the Illinois 
Court reasoned that when its legislature adopted the Uniform 
Commercial Code a companion enactment made it unlawful for a debtor 
to sell or dispose of security and fail to pay the secured party 
the proceeds due under the security agreement saying that under a 
penal statute even a course of dealing or use cannot raise an 
estoppel or constitute a waiver. 
It is significant that when the Utah Commercial Code was 
adopted an existing penal statute made it a crime to dispose of or 
take property out of the State in violation of a lien instrument. 
(See former Section 9-1-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) This was 
expressly repealed by the same chapter of the Laws of Utah, 1965 
I·Jhich inaugurated Utah's present commercial code. L. Utah '65, 
Chap. 154, p. 579. 
Even in spite of the extensive renovation of the Utah 
Comuercial Code in 1977, Section 70A-9-306(2) has never been 
cJOclificd. In light of the extensive comment and controversy upon 
dnd surrounding C! ou is> it must be presumed that the Utah legis-
lature's omission to amend Section 70A-9-306(2) was intentional. 
:2 CJS p. 860, ct.seq. :·~atut<s> §372. 
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POINT IV 
THIS IS NOT A CASE FOR RESTITUTION NOR ONE INVOKING 
THE PRINCIPLES OF RESTITUTION. 
A. THERE \.JAS NO UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
We are unable to expose any predicate for "restitution" 
in this case. It is axiomatic that restitution is an equitable 
remedy to require an unjustly-enriched defendant to restore to 
an injured plaintiff monies wrongfully held. 
Either being based upon the foregoing or upon a 
contract implied in law an unjust enrichment is basic to the 
subject of restitution and approached as a fundamental prin-
ciple thereo:'. Prrtatement of the Law of Restitution, §l. 
The :av.' 1-Jill never imply a promise to pay where it 
would bF ;r.; .. -'t to the party to whom it would be imputed and 
contrary to equity so to imply it. Restatement of Restitution, 
§§107 and 155. 
Quasi-contractual liability for unjust enrichment is 
based upon the ground that the person receiving a benefit which 
is unjust for him to retain ought to make restitution or pay 
the value of the benefit to the party entitled thereto* * * 
[and] whether, by the receipt of the funds in controversy, the 
defendant was enriched at the loss and expense of the plaintiff 
66 AmJur2d p. 946, Restc"tutiCJn ,uid Implied ro>:ihlC'i.D, ~3. 
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The problem with Hank's position here is that UTG 
was not enriched in any way by these transactions, justly or 
unjustly. Bank's brief itself charts meticulously the aggre-
gate deficit in Carlson Brothers' account accumulated by 
payments, not to Carl sons but to Bank itself: (l) "reverse 
settlements" for the years 1973 and 1974 because of advances 
by Norbest exceeding the ultimate liquidated price for 1974 
Carlsons' turkeys; (2) a check for $262,000.00 paid- not to 
Carlsons but to Bank - in December, 1974; and (3) failure to 
deduct that check from a check of $759,000.00 - paid to Bank 
and not to Carlsons - in July, 1975 which did not reflect the 
December advance to the Bank. None of these circlli~stances 
resulted in any unjust enrichment to the cooperative. They 
resulted in a temporary unjust enrichment to the Bank. 
The element of unjust enrichment is entirely absent. 
If there is no appearance of unjust enrichment there is no 
basis for restitution. 66 AmJur2d, at p. 947. 
B. BANK RECEIVED MORE THAN IT WAS EVER 
ENTITLED TO RECEIVE. 
In Tlu.·nrwid lie,; tern Company vs. Union Pacific Railr-oad, 
12 U2d 256, 365 P2d 65, this Court held that to prevail on 
the theory of unjust enrichment a claimant must show that the 
money sought v.•as received under such circumstances that would 
give offc·nse to equity and good conscience to permit the 
~c·o:s('s;;or to retain it. UTG does not have any money which it 
•s rr·t;lining. 
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Exhibit P-16 shows that in 1973 Carlson Brothers were 
over-advanced $64,254.79 representing their fair share of a 
calculated charge-back for that year totaling $130,811.30; in 
1974 were over-paid $120,627.23 representing their share of toti 
charge-backs of $335,075.62 and in 1975 were over-paid $272,725.~·1 
because of the 1975 check which duplicated a 1974 payment and 
that $457,608.00 had been over-advanced beyond their productioo 
as of May 28, 1976. Every other member of the cooperative 
I 
sustained a similar charge-back (See p. 1 of P-16). As Plaintif:l 
brief acknowledges only $345,000.00 of this amount was set off in 
1976 and $113,000.00 in 1977 but UTG was unable to recover 
$31,000.00 of excess payments (Exh. P-35). Bank did not release 
any security, as its crief intimates, but retained and received 
its rights in ::he: second generation proceeds of the 1975 and 1976 
turkey crop. Bank's inattention to the Carlson Brothers account 
is not chargeable to UTG. 
In Bank's brief it complains that a set-off was exer-
cised against Bank's expectancy under the 1976 "live flock" 
agreement. This agreement was not negotiated until June, 1976 
and there is no evidence of actual or constructive notice of it 
prior to that time (Exh. P-12, P-13). 
Under the authority of the cases cited in Points I 
and II of this brief the live flock agreement, being a contract 
between Carlson Brothers and UTG assigned to Bank, is subject 
to all set-offs and counterclaims provided in 70A-9-318 under 
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vere both subsections (1) and (2) because they "arose out of the 
contract" and "accrued before the account debtor (UTG) received 
in notification of the assignment". 
total 1 This satisfies the requirements of subsections (a) 
725 ,:~ and (b) of subsection (1) of 9-318 and furthermore, because 
' ''·I 
nd Carlson Brothers and UTG modified their contract in good 
tion faith and in accordance with reasonable corrnnercial standards, 
they made the modification (an express agreement to a set-
~ntiffi off) effective against the assignee (Bank) (Tr. 279, 280). 
1ff in The tenuous argument of Bank that it was unjustly 
deprived or the Bank unjustly enriched by any of these transfers, 
ease all of which were made directly to the Bank, prompts a 
ved consideration of what Bank would have done if the mistake had 
1976 been an under-payment to Carlson Brothers of an equal amount. 
)lint Bank certainly would have immediately demanded a complete 
accounting and complete payment and would not be asserting 
estoppel, restitution, unjust enrichment, or "final settlements". 
Bank's claim of equitable and good conscience remedies 
6 focuses attention immediately upon UTG's other grower members 
it who would be compelled to sustain a direct loss, not a divesti-
Lure of inequitable retainage, equal to the total amount which 
Eank would recover if they were successful in this lawsuit. 
:t 
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POINT V 
THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE. 
A. THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON NEGLIGENCE 
ARE BASED ON UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE IN VIRTUALLY 
EVERY INSTANCE. 
The following are the facts upon which Bank predicates 
its claim that UTG was negligent: (1) An employee of UTG failed 
to deduct a December, 1974 check \vhen she !'lade the annual 
settlement in August, 1975. However, both checks went to the 
Bank (Exh. P-18, 19). There was no question but that the 
$262,000.00 check when it "'as issued in December, 1974 would have 
been well within Caclson Brothers' production for that year (See 
Exh. P-35 sho~~n~ ~=~ ~3les of $2,124,090.00). The only testi-
money concerning the check was that in view of Carlson annual 
production the check issued in August, 1975 for $759,000.00 
(Exh. P-19) would not have appeared "large" and it certainly 
did not even look like an error to Carlson Brothers \vho said 
that "We had brought into the Bank and Bank had received a couple 
thousand more than what we had anticipated they would receive" 
(Tr. 263) and it certainly must not have appeared "large" to the 
Bank because they made no effort to repay it. 
(2) Gaylord Harward should have told Bank in the 
January, 1975 letter that Carlson Brothers' account would be 
subject to ensuing set-offs because of their indebtedness to 
UTG. This letter (Exh. P-19) states facts, for example: 
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it answered the questions he was asked which were limited to 
the number of pounds to Carlson Brothers' credit in storage 
as well as in current production (Exh. P-9). The opening 
sentence is: "You requested a letter as to current status on 
turkey sales". The first sentence in the second paragraph 
begins: "As you are aware", making it plain that First Security 
had already made its own calculations concerning Carlsons' 
tonnage. The next sentence of that paragraph tells how much 
has been advanced against that tonnage which is a statement of 
actual fact. 
In the telephone conversation requesting the letter 
there was no inquiry about money, only tonnage, and no inquiry 
about the status of Carlson Brothers' account, only about an 
inventory on hand (Tr. 223). 
(3) UTG made excess advances in the year 1973 and 1974. 
UTG relied on statements by an accountant (Tr. 380) and the belief 
that proper adjustments were being made either through the 
computer or by Norbest (Tr. 379). 
The issue of negligence is a mixed question of fact 
and law, often precluded from review (5 ArnJur 2d 271, Appeal 
1nd EJ'ror, 829). Where two or more inferences can be reasonably 
deduced from the facts a reviewing court will not substitute its 
deductions for those of the trial court. Simmons vs. F. W. 
i>'colworth Co., 329 P2d 999 (Cal. 1958). 
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The standard applied in negligence cases is that of 
reasonable or ordinary care to which one is held and the stan-
dard to which one is held is found in the conduct of a reasonably 
prudent person in like circumstances, not demanding extraordinary 
skill, caution or foresight (65 CJS 442, Negligence, §1(4)). 
That determination is likewise for the trier of fact (57 ArnJur 2d 
342, Negligence, §7). 
B. DETERl1INATIONS BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE 
ISSUE OF NEGLIGENCE ARE NOT TO BE DISTURBED 
ON REVIEW IF SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The findings of the trial court are entitled to control-
ling weight if there is any evidence in the record upon which 
they can be s~sta~~ed in an action at law and all those 
cases cited by buth Appellant and Respondent hold that an actioo 
under the Uniform Commercial Code is an action at law (Clovis 
National Bank vs. Thomas, 425 P2d 726 (N.M. 1967); Baker Product-:: 1 
Credit Association vs. Long Creek Meat Company, 513 P2d 1129 
(Ore . 1 9 7 3) ) . 
There was no contradiction of the testimony appearing 
at pages 11 and 12 of this brief. The only conflict is the 
interpretation placed upon, rather than a conflict in, the 
facts. Bank claims that there was a negligent misrepresentatioo 
in the January 7, 1976 letter. The trial court found what stan-
dard of care should have been applied in this case which findi~-
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one of fact and the province of the trier of the facts. (57 
AmJur 2d 342, Negligence, §7. See also McMul Zen vs. Ursuline 
Order of Sisters, 246 P2d 1052 (N.M. 1952). 
Elmer vs. Vanderford, 445 P2d 612, 614 (Wash. 1968) holds: 
There are two classes of cases in which the 
question of negligence may be determined by 
the court as a conclusion of law* * *The first 
is where the circumstances of the case are such 
that the standard of duty is fixed, and the 
measure of duty defined, by law, and is the same 
under all circumstances* * *and the second is 
where the facts are undisputed and but one 
reasonable influence can be drawn from them* * * 
Therefore, only where the "precise measure of duty 
is clearly defined" does the issue of the standard of care in 
a negligence case become a question of law taken away from the 
trier of fact. Clark vs. Joslin Dry Goods Company, 262 P2d 546 
(Colo. 1953). 
C. EVEN IF NEGLIGENCE EXISTED IT HAS NOT 
ACTIONABLE. BANK HISINTERPRETS THE 
RESTATEHENT OF TORTS. 
Hhile the Court has found as a fact that the letter 
' of January 1976 (Exh. P-9) was not negligent it also is 
demonstrably not actionable even if acknowledged to be negligent. 
Bank has misinterpreted Section 552 of the Restatement 
of Tor·ts and Official Comment in attempting to apply them to the 
January, 1975 letter. 
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We agree that those provisions are applicable to this 
case and that Bank has correctly quoted parts of the text and 
comment. The American Law Institute has unmistakably concluded 
that as a condition precedent to liability for a statement, 
although negligently made, the declarant must have a pecuniary 
interest drawing from which he can obtain a benefit to himself as 
a result of conduct reasonably to be expected as a response from 
the person to whom the statement is made. 
The Restatement of Torts reads: 
§552. Information Negligently Supplied 
for the Guidance of Others. 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, 
profession or employment, or in any other 
transaction in which he has pecuniary interest, 
supplies false information for the guidance of 
others in tl-.eir- business transactions, is subject 
to liabii:'.c-' :u::- pecuniary loss caused to them 
by their J~stifiable reliance upon the information, 
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information. [Emphasis added] 
The Official Comment states: 
Comment on Subsection (l); 
c. Pecuniarw interest in the transaction. 
The rule stated-in Subsection (1) applies 
only when the defendant has a pecuniart 
interest in the transaction in which t e 
information is given. If he has no pecuniary 
interest and the information is given purely 
gratuitously, he is under no duty to exercise 
reasonable care and competence in giving it;\" -;, -:,; 
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d. The defendant's pecuniary interest 
in supplying the information will normally 
lie in a consideration paid to him for it 
or paid in a transaction in the course of 
and as a part of which it is supplied* * * 
* * *that the information is given in the 
course of the defendant's business, profession 
or employment is a sufficient indication that 
he has a pecuniary interest in it, even 
though he receives no consideration for it at 
the time. [Emphasis added]. 
Bank's error is in concluding that a statement made 
either "in the course of his business" or in which declarant 
has "a pecuniary interest" will be sufficient. It is clear 
that the Institute requires that the statement be made in all 
events in a transaction in which the declarant has a pecuniary 
interest which may, but need not necessarily, be inferred 
from the fact the declarant is making the statement, acting 
"in the course of his business". 
In Harger & James "The Law of Torts", §7.7, it is 
even more strongly put: 
When the action is for false and fraudulent 
representations [and] the person making the 
representation is not a party to the 
transaction and in no way profits by the 
act of the party defrauded in reliance on 
the representations made by him, he is 
liable for damage only in case he knows the 
representations made by him to be false, 
and makes them for the purpose of deception, 
and with the intent that they shall be 
relied on and acted on by the person to 
whom they are made and loss or damages 
results therefrom. 
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Bank improperly asks the Court to conclude that if 
a declarant is in the course of his activities or business 
pursuits it necessarily follows that anything he does has a 
"pecuniary interest" attached to it. For a negligent mis-
statement to be actionable it must be made for the purpose of 
producing a reaction to the statement that would develop a 
pecuniary benefit to the declarant. Restatement of Torts, 
§552, supra. (It is important to keep in mind that the court 
found the statement not to be negligent.) 
All the testimony that can be found from the record 
reflects only that while Carlson Brothers was a valued and 
friendly associate, UTG was able to conduct its affairs 
successfully without them (Tr. 171, 240, 338) and that there 
are adequate r~-~ey growers to fill UTG's plant capacity 
(Tr. 24, 242) . 
Bank is struggling when it endeavors to link up a 
chain of events beginning with Bank's imprecise inquiry for and 
UTG's responsive statements to Bank, and produce even the 
possibility of any pecuniary interest to be derived therefrom 
by UTG. 
First, it is not sufficient that UTG values Carlson 
Brothers' membership. It is essential, to establish their 
pecuniary interest, that UTG benefited monetarily from 
Carlson Brothers' membership. This absolutely is not shown 
by the evidence but would be insufficient if it were. 
More importantly, it is essential to show that 
financing by some creditor was required to keep Carlson 
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Brothers in the cooperative, of which there is no evidence, 
and furthermore, it is necessary to show that even if financing 
by some institution were required, First Security Bank was 
the only one who would have furnished that financing. None 
of those elements is shown in the evidence. 
Even if it were concluded that an act "in the course 
of one's business'' is sufficient in and of itself to constitute 
actionable negligence, the acts of Mr. Harward were clearly 
outside of the cooperative's purposes and any duty of MI. 
Harward as its employee. 
It was not in the course of business of UTG to 
advise any third parties, creditors or grower members or 
anyone else, of the status of accounts of grower members 
Those circumstances have a confidential, classified privilege. 
UTG had no pecuniary interest in disclosing that information; 
therefore, the inference Bank attemps to draw from Comment 
(d) fails. The term "in the course of his business" means 
for, on behalf and to the benefit of a client, employer, 
patron, or other principal to whom he owes a duty of fidelity 
like an accountant owes a duty to a business hiring him, a 
lawyer to his client, and a salesman to his merchant-employer. 
The inference approved by Comment (d) might be sustainable if 
an accountant supplied a statement to a firm by whom he was 
employed and the accountant had reasonable cause to believe 
ur should have suspected that the statement would reach third 
parties, not in privity with the accountant, who may act upon 
it to their detriment, in which case the statement may be 
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actionable. However, the courts have not as yet developed 
this as established law. MiZUncr us. FZm,·r Fox;: rc'., 529 
P2d 806 (Utah 1974). Annot. 46 ALR3d 979. In this case, 
Gaylord Harward was not an accountant, was not engaged in the 
course of his business for UTG when he wrote the letter of 
January, 1976 and was not pursuing any purpose for his superior 
when the statement was made. 57 CJS 298, Master and Servant, 
§570b. 
No inference of negligence can be based on mere 
surmise, guess, speculation or probability. Continental 
Motors Corp. vs. Joly, 482 P2d 244 (Wyo. 1971). Neither can 
negligence be established by a mere inference or conjecture. 
To warrant a finding of negligence the evidence must establish 
the essential facts as probably, not merely possibly, being 
true. McConnell v:. ci·~.J;,omu tJas and F:lectric Companu, 563 
P2d 632 (Okla. 1977) (See also Simmons vs. Wooluwrth Co., 
supra.) 
POINT VI 
THE ISSUE OF MUTUALITY IS NOT RELEVANT TO THIS 
CASE. UTAH TURKEY GROWERS COULD EXERCISE A 
SET-OFF AGAINST CARLSON BROTHERS AND OWED BANK 
NOTHING FURTHER THAN ANY EXCESS. 
Bank 1 s brief argues an undefined requirement of "mutual it' 
as a condition precedent to set-off. The only authority cited 
by Bank is a subsection in the Article Set-Off and 
Counterclaim of Corpus Juris Secundum. The context from 
which Bank 1 s authority is abstracted has to do with the defense,, 
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a\'ailable to pu1;chasers, for value and without notice, of claims 
~ chases in action as well as holders in due course of nego-
tiable instruments or other freely-transferable demands. In 
fact, the heading which Bank q~otes deals not with the substance 
of set-offs but with "Crosr. Demands" (80 CJS, p. 74). The 
title to §48 is "Parties to anr. Mutuality of, Cross Demands" 
and the substance of the treatise immediately following is drawn 
from suits in Hhich a cros:>claim or counterclaim is asserted and 
the cases footnoted obviously support only the rule that 
rights of strangers to the litigation cannot be used by a party 
in defending an action brought against him. The Bank's citations 
regarding mutuality also reflect cases whose purpose is to prevent 
viecemeal litigation. 
If there had ever been any requirement of mutuality 
conditional to a set-off it has been obliterated by Section 
9-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code which expressly grants 
' the right of set-off in triangular disputes. (1962 Code 
Comment, pp. 627, 693) We respectfully observe that this point 
, "eeds no further discussion. 
POINT VII 
THERE WAS NO PREDICATE FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
OR A HAIVER OF UTG'S RIGHT TO SET-OFF AGAINST 
CARLSON BROTHERS AND B~NK 
Estoppel and waiver of a fundamental right are not 
~'Lerally favored in the law. In fact it is commonly stated 
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that estoppels are odious because they exclude the truth 
and are used, in accord with good conscience, honesty, and 
reason only, and wherever it is necessary to prevent fraud 
(31 CJS pp. 291, 292, Estoppel, §3). 
To invoke the doctrine of estoppel, every element of 
fact essential to it must be proved clearly and the evidence 
must be certain in every particular and it must not leave the 
matter doubtful or uncertain (31 CJS, p. 775, Estoppel, §162). 
In Corporation Nine vs. Taylor, 30 U2d 47, 513 P2d 417, 
this Court said: 
In looking at the principle of estoppel as 
applicable to the evidence here these observations 
are pertinent. The determination of such an 
issue is not dependent on the asserted sub-
jective content of the mind of the person 
claiming he was misled. The test to be 
applied is an objective one as to what a 
reasonable and prudent person in the circumstances 
might conclude; and the burden of proof and 
of persuasion as to the issue of estoppel is 
upon him who asserts it. 
The refusal of the trial court to so find is indulged 
with the usual presumptions of verity; and this 
court on review will not overturn his determination 
and compel such a finding unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates to the contrary. 
To constitute an estoppel by conduct, there must exist 
a false representation or concealment of material facts; it 
must have been made with knowledge, actual or constructive, 
of the facts; the party to whom it was made must have been 
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~ithout knowledge or the means of knowledge of the real facts; 
it must have been made with the intention that it should be 
acted on; and the party to whom it was made must have relied on 
or acted on it to his prejudice (31 CJS p. 402, Estoppel, §67). 
Bank has admitted it claims no fraud and cannot extend 
its case to prove negligence. Too many elements are lacking 
upon which to base its claim for estoppel. 
To constitute a waiver, there must be an existing 
right, benefit, or advantage, knowledge, actual or constructive, 
of the existence of such right, benefit or advantage, and an 
actual intention to relinquish it, or such conduct as warrants 
an inference of relinquishment (31 CJS p. 408, Estoppel, §67). 
The bank cannot seriously claim that UTG purposely 
wived or intended to relinquish its right to a set-off. 
These are arguments completely answered by the recent 
Utah Supreme Court case of Maytime Manor, Inc. vs. Stokermatic, 
, Inc., Case No. 15975, June 19, 1979 [not yet reported] which 
announces, in an equitable lease reformation case, that: 
* * *for this Court to affirm the District 
Court's judgment, it need only conclude that 
the evidence presented to the District Court 
does not clearly preponderate against the 
findings of that Court. 
This was a case where the District Court had granted 
reformation and the Supreme Court was asked to reverse on the 
ground that the evidence was not "clear and convincing". In 
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this case the trial court has found there was no evidence to 
support estoppel but Bank is seeking a finding that not only was 
there evidence but that it was clear and convincing. 
As to the right of UTG to set-off claims to which it 
was lawfully entitled see Chase Manhattan Bank vs. State, 357 
NE2d 366 (N.Y. 1976). 
CONCLUSION 
The Bank has intentionally waived its right to a 
literal or a strict enforcement of its security in the turkeys 
and their proceeds. Bank has converted its interest in the 
collateral to the rights of an assignee. 
For the reasons expressed heretofore the rights of 
Bank can rise to no higher level than any rights which Carlson 
Brothers may have against UTG. Carlson Brothers has no rights 
but a deficit of over $31,000.00. The Uniform Commercial Code 
subjects whatever rights Bank had to the defenses and set-offs 
UTG has exercised. 
The trial court has found on Bank's second theory 
that there was no negligence and no duty giving rise to a claim 
against UTG in favor of Bank and those findings are supported 
by an abundance of evidence. There was neither, as Bank 
claims, any unjust enrichment or basis for restitution and 
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UTG had the duty to its grower members to off-set the Carlson 
Brothers' account for excess payments previously made to the Bank. 
To reverse the trial court's findings and ruling would 
be to compel UTG not only to pay twice but to pay the same 
entity twice and the penalty would be visited upon the innocent 
member growers of UTG who would be forced to sustain the loss. 
For those reasons the decision of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Tel. 896-4461 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE 
we acknowledge that two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent were served upon us by Olsen and Chamberlain, 
delivered to our office at 400 Deseret Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah (84111) this 20th day of August, 1979. 
RAY OUINNEY & NEBEKER 
By Do~ B. Allen and 
James L. Wilde 
By I~/ {'{·;?;· tur nf2.2 
I 
- 49 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
